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SAFETY AND COMPLEXITY: INTER-DEPARTMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS 
AS A THREAT TO PATIENT SAFETY IN THE OPERATING DEPARTMENT 
 
 
Purpose: Current thinking about ‘patient safety’ emphasises the causal relationship 
between the work environment and the delivery of clinical care. This research draws on 
the theory of Normal Accidents to extend this analysis and better understand the 
‘organisational factors’ that threaten safety. 
 Methods: Ethnographic research methods were used, with observations of the operating 
department setting for 18 month and interviews with 80 members of hospital staff. The 
setting for the study was the Operating Department of a large teaching hospital in the 
North-West of England. 
Results: The work of the operating department is determined by inter-dependant, ‘tightly 
coupled’ organisational relationships between hospital departments based upon the timely 
exchange of information, services and resources required for the delivery of care. Failures 
within these processes, manifest as ‘breakdowns’ within inter-departmental relationships 
lead to situations of constraint, rapid change and uncertainty in the work of the operating 
department that require staff to break with established routines and work with increased 
time and emotional pressures. This means that staff focus on working quickly, as opposed 
to working safely.   
Conclusion: Analysis of safety needs to move beyond a focus on the immediate work 
environment and individual practice, to consider the more complex and deeply structured 
organisational systems of hospital activity. For departmental managers the scope for 
service planning to control for safety may be limited as the structured ‘real world’ 
situation of service delivery is shaped by inter-department and organisational factors that 
are perhaps beyond the scope of departmental management. 
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SAFETY AND COMPLEXITY: INTER-DEPARTMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS 
AS A THREAT TO PATIENT SAFETY IN THE OPERATING DEPARTMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last decade there has been a growing international recognition that health care 
services are dangerous places and constitute significant threats to the safety of patients 
(World Health Organisation (WHO), 2004). For the National Health Service (NHS) of 
England and Wales it is estimated that one in ten hospital patients experience some form 
of clinical error. On an annual basis it is calculated that there are as many as 850000 such 
incidents, costing the NHS over £2billion in extra and remedial care and potentially 
claiming the lives of up to 40000 patients. Such figures are not unique to the UK but have 
been found in other Western health care systems (WHO, 2004). 
 
‘Patient safety’ is now a major UK health policy priority, with ‘safety’ designated as a 
leading ‘standard’ for the Healthcare Commission’s assessment of health care providers. 
A National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) has been created to lead policy development 
and champion service-wide learning across the NHS, with a National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) being established throughout the service. The NRLS is seen as 
offering a robust and proactive system of organisational learning and safety management 
that routinely gathers information about the actual and potential risks to patient safety, 
thereby enabling the identification of opportunities for service improvement (NPSA 
2003). A significant element of the patient safety agenda has been to promote a new way 
of thinking about safety, whereby risks are not seen as merely the result of chance or 
‘human error’, but rather the product of underlying factors located in the wider socio-
organisational context of care delivery. In policy, this ‘systems approach’ (Reason, 2000) 
is articulated as ‘root cause analysis’, encouraging service leaders to seek out the 
underlying threats to patient safety preconditioned within the organisational and inter-
personal environment of clinical work (NPSA, 2003). An important issues for health 
service management and quality improvement is the degree to which this ‘root cause 
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analysis’ should be undertaken, i.e. at what level is causality seen as residing. Much of 
the prevailing theoretical and empirical work in this field typically focuses on the 
relationship between individual performance and the immediate work context. This paper 
is concerned with exploring and extending the application of these ideas to better 
understand the organisational context. 
 
The focus of our study is the hospital operating department, which is often categorised as 
an unsafe area of care provision. For example, an analysis of 1200 completed hospital 
cases by Health Care Risk Resources International found that operating theatres were 
‘high risk’ and that within the processes of surgical care the greatest risk to safety was 
‘unintentional damage’ to the patient (28%), followed by ‘diagnostic error’ (27%) 
(Wilson, 1999). A prospective examination of outcomes for over 4,500 surgical
 
patients 
in a US University teaching hospital suggested that between thirty and fifty per cent of 
major complications in patients undergoing general surgical procedures are avoidable 
(Healey et al, 2002). One recent study suggested that the probable incidence of error in 
the surgical intensive care unit is potentially as great as one in every two patients (Krizek, 
2000), and another retrospective case review detected that up to 16.2% of General 
Surgery records contained instances of ‘adverse events’ (Vincent et al, 2001). There are 
many threats to safety in the operating theatre, associated with the invasive nature of 
surgery, professional competence, the inherent risks of anaesthesia, and the quality of 
teamwork with the theatre (Carthey et al, 2003). Reflecting a ‘systems approach’ one 
recent study of urgent and emergency surgery found that the safety of more than half 
(54%) of all cases was threatened by organisational factors related to competing 
demands, unavailable information, and the late arrival of staff or patients (Pearse et al, 
2001). In this paper we draw on ethnographic research to further investigate these 
organisational factors in the operating theatre with the aim of locating them within a 
broader analytical and theoretical perspective from which to frame our analysis. 
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Theorising the threats to patient safety 
 
As indicated above, much of the current thinking about ‘patient safety’ has been informed 
by the theories of cognitive and social psychology, ergonomics, and the Human Factors 
approach or what is sometimes called ‘safety science’ (see Department of Health, 2000). 
Whereas cognitive psychology shows how the schema of mental performance can 
fracture or lapse leading to human error (Rasmussen and Jensen, 1974), social 
psychology highlights the interplay between this cognitive dimension and the 
environmental context of behaviour. A conceptual distinction is made between the active 
errors of individual behaviour at the ‘sharp-end’ of work, and the latent factors located 
‘upstream’ within the work system that influence individual or group performance 
(Reason, 1997). These ‘factors’ can include, the design of tasks, the nature of teamwork, 
the management of equipment, and the presence and effectiveness of instructions, safety 
checks or backup systems (Reason, 1997). When considering the threats to safety, 
attention is therefore directed at those factors that enabled or exacerbated the potential for 
human error (Leape, 1999). Applied alongside models of quality assurance and risk 
management this approach, together with the principles of High Reliability Theory 
(Rochlin, 1987), represents a prevailing discourse for organisational learning and safety. 
 
Within the health care context the Human Factors approach has consistently been 
promoted as a new and alternate way of addressing the problems of clinical error and 
patient safety (Department of Health, 2000; Leape, 1999; Vincent, 1993; Reason, 2000). 
Vincent and Reason (1999) have applied this approach to show that the threats to patient 
safety are rooted in ‘task’, ‘team’, ‘situational’ and ‘organisational’ factors. ‘Task factors’ 
include, for example, a lack of work standardisation or excessive reliance on memory; 
‘team factors’ include issues of communication, leadership, decision-making and 
situational awareness; ‘situational factors’ are those found in the immediate work 
environment such as time pressures, information flows, poor procedures, and the design 
of human-system interfaces; whilst ‘organisational factors’ include the presence of early 
warning or defensive systems, the contribution made be incident reporting and the extent 
of organisational redundancy. Vincent et al (1998) have added to this categorisation to 
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suggest that the threats to patient safety are brought about by even wider socio-
organisational factors, including the ‘institutional context’ of health care politics and 
policy, together with a broader understanding of ‘organisational and managerial factors’ 
that considers in the wider role of management planning and organisational cultures. In 
policy, these ideas are articulated as  ‘root cause analysis’, the philosophy by which the 
service should seek out the threats to patient safety to make service improvement, 
principally through participating in the new systems of incident reporting and risk 
management found in the NRLS and then identifying the underlying latent factors that 
threaten safety. 
  
Although the prevailing ‘systems approach’ certainly moves beyond an individualised 
‘person-centre’ understanding of human error (Reason, 2000), its predominant focus 
remains at the micro level of individual or group performance. Mezzo and macro level 
issues, for example, organisational networks, occupational cultures and political pressures 
are recognised as influencing safety (e.g. Vincent et al, 1998), but they are not developed 
theoretically or empirically as distinct and inter-related levels of analysis. In other words 
there is a reductionist tendency to conflate analysis to the level of the individual and the 
immediate work environment (the psycho-social), rather than consider the distinct and 
inter-connected contributions at the mezzo (organisational-cultural) and macro (social 
and political) levels. In the practical terms of ‘root cause analysis’ this may mean that 
organisational learning fails to adequately explore the broader (or fundamental) socio-
cultural or organisational causal factors being more concerned with the more apparent 
factors located within the work environment. In addressing these other dimensions insight 
can be gained from other writers (Turner, 1978; Perrow, 1984; Vaughan, 1996) who have 
more thoroughly explored the social and cultural nature of organisational deviance, 
accidents and safety. 
 
When considering the organisational dimension, especially the structures and processes 
of work, much can be gleaned from Perrow’s (1984) study of ‘normal accidents’. He 
suggests that for organisational systems dealing with complex technologies (or tasks) 
accidents are inevitable or normal, not purely because of the high-risk nature of work or 
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the potential for ‘operator error’, but because of the way work systems are organised in to 
encourage isolated ‘discrete failures’ to cascade out of control and escalate into more 
substantial disasters. This is elaborated along two lines: ‘interactive complexity’ and 
‘organisational coupling’. ‘Interactive complexity’ refers to the process by which 
commonplace, small and ‘discrete failures’ often located within different organisational 
sub-systems can interact and combine in unexpected and sometimes undetectable ways, 
and within sufficiently complex systems these can produce more profound accidents. 
Linked to this is an understanding of how organisational sub-systems are arranged and 
the degree of inter-dependence or ‘coupling’ between organisational processes. Where 
organisational units and activities are ‘tightly coupled’ failures located within one process 
can spread throughout the wider system through a series of escalating knock-on effects as 
interdependent tasks and processes are progressively compromised or impaired, 
especially for time-dependant processes that rely on specialised staff and resources that 
cannot easily be substituted. An organisation’s structural arrangements can therefore 
transform risky or dangerous situations into disasters or normal accidents (Perrow, 1984).  
 
 
Despite directing our attention to ‘the system’, the prevailing theories of ‘patient safety’ 
do not fully engage with the existing organisational and sociological theories that can 
better inform our understanding of the complex organisational factors that shape the 
delivery of patient care and can turn insignificant failures, often overlooked by clinical 
staff, into more significant, but also normal, accidents in care delivery. Although Normal 
Accident Theory tends to focus on the development of major disasters and it is sometimes 
seen as excessively pessimistic, particularly in contrast to the proactive and managerial 
stance of ‘safety science’ and High Reliability Theory (Rijpma, 1997), it nevertheless 
provides a basis from which to better understand the organisational context of safety in 
health care.  In this paper we draw on the work of Perrow (1984) to more advance a less 
reductionist approach to safety that seeks to more thoroughly understand the threats to 
patient safety manifest within the organisational structures and processes of the operating 
department, whilst also considering the relationship between this organisational level and 
the micro levels of patient care. 
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Methods 
 
This paper is based upon an ethnographic study carried out between 2003-04 in the 
operating department of a single large teaching hospital in northern England. We used 
standard ethnographic research methods to investigate social, cultural and organisational 
issues related to patient safety within this setting, including observations, informal and 
formal interviewing and documentary analysis (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Finn 
and Waring, 2005). Ethical approval was obtained in advance of the study through the 
Local Research Ethics Committee and participants were informed of the study’s 
objectives. 
 
We carried out non-participatory observations within the operating department on a daily 
basis for 18 months. These observations took place in various locations, such as staff 
rooms, management meetings, corridors, reception areas and various clinical settings, 
including ten operating theatres with adjoining anaesthetic rooms and two recovery areas. 
From these findings we also made observations of other hospital settings related to the 
work of the operating department, including outpatient clinics, surgical wards and 
laboratory services. From these observations we were able to ‘map’ the organisational 
networks, processes and relationships that contributed to the work of the operating 
department, including a record of recurrent ‘bottlenecks’, ‘crisis points’ and 
‘breakdowns’ in the planned or designated working arrangements as perceived by staff 
members. A further period of observations was undertaken to better understand how 
these organisational issues affected the routines and patterns of work within the operating 
theatre. Our observations were recorded in field journals together with reflective 
notebooks.  
 
Alongside our observations we interviewed those involved in the work of the operating 
department both formally and informally. Informal interviews were carried out in situ 
whilst making our observations and involved opportunistic chats and conversations with 
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staff members. These were used to clarify and further understand work activities and 
were recorded alongside our observational records. We also interviewed 80 members of 
hospital staff more formally outside the immediate work setting, including 14 consultant-
grade surgeons of mixed speciality, 12 consultant-grade anaesthetists, 14 members of 
theatre nursing staff of mixed grade, 4 operating department managers, and a range of 
managers, administrators and professional representatives from other hospital 
departments, as well as senior hospital managers and executives. There participants were 
purposively selected on the basis of their occupational role and contribution to the 
working of the operating department. These semi-structured face-to-face interviews were 
recorded electronically with the consent of the participants and followed a topic guide 
that involved asking participants to describe their work environment and activities, with 
particular focus on what they saw as the as the threats to patient safety within their work 
context. This guide evolved throughout the research process to reflect emerging issues 
and topics that were of theoretical relevance. 
 
The interview data, together with the observational records, were electronically 
transcribed and entered into the computer package Atlas ti for the purpose of data 
analysis, which followed the strategic principles of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). This was led by two of the authors who scrutinised the findings to develop a 
descriptive understanding of the operating department’s structures, systems, process and 
group and individual activities. Through this process we were able to develop conceptual 
models of the operating department with reference to its interactive complexity and 
couplings in the form of inter-departmental relations. We further analysed the data to 
identify and code the descriptions, attitudes, assumptions and viewpoints of individuals 
and professional groups involved in the work of the operating department to understand 
how organisational processes could impact upon the safety of practice. These coded 
findings were further compared and contrasted for their consistency and conceptual 
relationships, and with the observational records provided the basis of our analysis. 
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The findings 
 
The operating department as a tightly coupled ‘organisational hub’ 
 
The operating department is, in broad terms, concerned with the planning, preparation 
and provision of the operating theatre environment for the delivery of surgical care. 
‘Theatres’ constitute a specialised space that, unlike most wards and clinics, is closed off 
from other areas of the hospital, has controlled environmental conditions for light, air and 
aseptic conditions, relies upon a supply of specialised drugs, equipment and 
instrumentation, and is the designated setting for the delivery of surgical care carried out 
and supported by a group of specialist professionals. In order for operating department to 
prepare and maintain this environment for the safe delivery of surgical care it relies upon 
the communication, exchange and transfer of essential resources, services, information 
and skills from other hospital departments. A number of prominent hospital departments 
were identified as providing essential ‘ingredients’ in the work of the operating 
department. Each of these possess a series of specialised tasks that together, through a 
series of inter-departmental interactions, contribute to the overall care of the patient, 
either directly through providing clinical care or indirectly through providing support 
services to the operating department (see figure 1). For example, it is on the surgical 
wards care that the patient receives care both before and after surgery and the wards have 
an important relationship with ‘theatres’ primarily for preparing and transferring the 
patient; departments such as the Sterile Services Unit (SSU), Histopathology and 
Radiology provide important patient information and specialist equipment and resources 
needed for surgical care; and the High Dependency Unit (HDU) has important post-
operative links with ‘theatres’ for the provision of intensive care. For surgical care within 
the operating department to be both effective and safe these other departments must 
function satisfactorily and also interact appropriately with ‘theatres’. It is also worth 
considering that in terms of staff allocation surgeons and anaesthetists are also based 
within other specialist hospital departments and therefore decisions taken about staff 
allocation and planning are also made outside the realm of operating theatre management, 
with only theatre nurses (including anaesthetic, scrub and recovery) and other support 
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staff, such as Health Care Assistants being based within the operating department. When 
these organisational arrangements and processes are conceptualised as a network of inter-
dependant organisational units and processes, the operating department can be interpreted 
as the ‘organisational hub’ to which key relationships must be active within particular 
temporal and spatial parameters (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1. Prominent departmental functions integral to operating department 
performance 
 
Department Function 
Surgical ward Where patients receive pre- and post- operative care 
Sterile Services Where surgical instruments are sterilised, maintained and 
prepared 
High Dependency Unit Where high-risk patients receive intensive post-operative 
care 
Radiology Where diagnostic images are taken and analysed pre-, inter- 
or post-operatively 
Histopathology Where biological specimens are analysed pre-, inter- or 
post-operatively 
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Figure 2 The Organisational context of the Operating Department 
 
 
 
 
“[T]here’s a lot of pressure outside. You see we think of theatres but of course 
you have to think of all the pressure outside, like the wards, HDU beds…” (P5) 
 
 “Everybody is juggling, it is just getting it right in the end really isn’t it and 
making sure things run smoothly and not rushing too much.” (P8) 
 
 
Theatre management readily acknowledged the pressures and constraints placed on the 
operating department by these other departments and inter-departmental relationships. 
We found that a significant role of the management team was to ensure that these 
relationships were appropriately planned and co-ordinated for each scheduled surgical 
procedure. We observed how on a daily basis department managements and senior 
members of nursing staff would strive to secure and maintain stable and co-ordinated 
relationships with these other hospital departments, often negotiating arrangements over 
the telephone or in person at the last minute to safeguard the provision of supplies or 
track down missing items. In addition to these ad hoc activities at the ‘coal face’ of 
Surgical Ward Operating 
Department 
Sterile 
Services 
Surgical Ward 
High 
Dependency 
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Lab. And 
Radio. 
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departmental work, we also found that departmental management convened a weekly 
‘scheduling meeting’ with representatives from these other departments. The explicit 
purpose of this meeting was to discuss and plan the resource, skill and information needs 
for each scheduled surgical procedure detailed on the ‘theatre lists’ for the following 
week. The aim of this meeting was to more accurately schedule and arrange departmental 
activities around the designated list of surgical procedures, through anticipating and 
planning the resource and information needs, the staff skill-mix, and the need for 
specialised post-operative care and in doing so enabling operating department to function 
effectively. Although this meeting enabled each department to plan their own work 
activities in relation to the needs of others, we noted that the changes made were largely 
confined to the individual department with little attention given the relationships between 
department or perhaps more significantly to the intrinsic role by the structured 
organisational arrangement of hospital departments and activities.  
 
When attempting to understand how these organisational arrangements and processes 
may provide the opportunities and catalyst for unsafe patient care, it is worth returning to 
Perrow’s (1984) analysis of normal accidents. According to this perspective, accidents or 
in this case the risks of unsafe patient care are more likely to arise where the 
organisational context is characterised by ‘interactive complexity’ and ‘tightly coupled’ 
processes. As suggested by our initial findings the work of the operating department is 
dependant upon the activities of various other hospital departments. Each of these 
possesses a distinct series of tasks, using specialised staff and resources, and through the 
completion of these activities they contribute to the delivery of surgical care. Within each 
of these hospital departments exists the inherent potential for human error or the failure to 
adequately complete tasks, but given the tight coupling between departments there exists 
the potential for minor, insignificant or overlooked to spread, combine and escalate 
across the wider network and ultimately threatening the safety of patient care. This is 
especially the case for the operating department at the centre or ‘hub’ of the 
organisational network, which is highly dependant on these other hospital departments 
for specialised, time-dependant and irreplaceable resources. The potential for danger in 
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the operating theatre is therefore perhaps inevitable or normal because of its dependence 
on inter-departmental relationships with other specialised hospital departments.  
 
This theoretical analysis adds to and compliments the prevailing Human Factors 
approach by elaborating upon our understanding of how systemic organisational 
arrangements can represent potential risk factors. By modelling the organisational context 
of the operating department in this way our next question was to understand how and in 
what ways do these tightly coupled and complex inter-departmental interactions threaten 
organisational and patient safety.  
 
 
Inter-departmental breakdowns  
 
The operating department’s dependence upon these other specialised hospital units for 
essential resources, skills, information and support meant that failures experienced in one 
department could easily be transmitted to the wider network and have further 
repercussions for the effective and safe delivery of surgical care. The source and nature 
of these ‘problems’ were various and in many ways unique to the specific department, for 
example, SSU had consistent problems with staff retention, whilst the surgical wards 
often struggled to function when dealing with the competing demands of new admissions. 
With reference to the activities of the operating department the impact of these isolated 
issues was manifest in what we have termed ‘organisational breakdowns’. This is where 
one inter-departmental interaction would fail or slip out of sequence due to problems 
experienced within one department, modifying or fracturing the planned exchange of 
goods and services, and introducing secondary pressures within the work of the operating 
department. Our observations, supported by interview data, reveal many of these 
‘breakdowns’, which we divided into three categories; delays (items delivered at the 
wrong time), miscommunications (items or information with the incorrect content) or 
missing transactions (where items fail to be exchanged). Each of which can be seen as 
framed by the complex tasks carried out by each department and also their high degrees 
of inter-dependency.  
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The operating department’s relationship with the surgical wards was the most frequent 
site for systemic failure. For two thirds of the scheduled operations we observed delays in 
the scheduled transfer of the patient from the surgical ward to the operating department of 
between 5 and 20 minutes. These were typically the result of competing tasks, staff 
shortages and technical difficulties within the wards. We also found that interactions 
between the operating department and the surgical ward were characterised by missing 
information, such as the patient’s signed consent form, whilst on a number of occasion 
patients were brought to theatre without being appropriately prepared for surgery, for 
example, they were still wearing jewellery or dentures, or had not been given the 
appropriate sedatives.  
 
“You phone up at 8.00am and say ‘so and so, and so and so need to be ready’, 
[but] you can send for your first one and you can find that the porter has gone to 
the ward and they are not ready, their bloods are not done, there are problems 
with consent, big issues that delay things.” (P8) 
 
The collection of post-operative patients for their return to the ward also incurred 
frequent delays, with about one quarter of these transfers between the operating 
department and the ward delayed in excess of 15 minutes. This had the effect of blocking 
beds on the department’s recovery unit, where post-operative patients received specialist 
care whilst recovering from the anaesthetic and surgery, and created log jams in the flow 
of departmental work. On a number of occasions where ward staff were absent or 
excessively delayed, recovery nurses were required to leave designated duties in order to 
transfer the patients to the ward thereby leaving the unit short of staff. 
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“We have had to wait 40 minutes sometimes for the ward staff to collect the 
patients. I know they are busy and everything, but it blocks our beds and effects 
how we work…we have had to take some of the patients back ourselves but then 
you have the problem of being a staff member down” (Recovery nurse: field 
notes) 
 
For patients needing intensive post-operative care, theatre staff, typically the theatre 
sisters, were required by departmental policy to request and secure a specialist bed within 
the HDU, before commencing surgery. Although these were often reserved several hours 
or days in advance of the operation, based upon the scheduled list of procedures, we 
found that around half of those operations needing this type of post-operative care were 
delayed in their start by between 10 and 40 minutes because a HDU bed could not be 
guaranteed. The time in which these delays were most common was early in the morning, 
especially Mondays as the HDU dealt with weekend emergencies. On two occasions we 
also recorded how an pre-arranged and guaranteed HDU bed became occupied by another 
patient mid-way through the surgical procedure, which resulted in the designated surgical 
patient being deprived of this specialist bed for over 30 minutes, during which time the 
post-operative patient remained anaesthetised in the operating theatre until a bed was 
made available, but this introduced further risks to patient care and the planned work of 
the operating department. Where delays were expected to be long surgical staff would 
suggest re-arranging the order of patients or cancelling the operation, which further 
introduced further complications in the work of the operating department. 
 
“We had one case where somebody was cancelled because there was no HDU 
bed, so just one of the resources was not there, and the patient went home with a 
new date organised and died in between.” (P42) 
 
The relationship with SSU could also affect the workings of the operating department. 
The provision of surgical instrumentation was based upon the designated schedule of 
surgical procedures, whereby the appropriate instrumentation ‘tray’ would be sterilised 
and made ready for use before being transported to theatre. It was expected that 
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instrumentation would be delivered in advance of the surgical start time to enable nursing 
staff to complete all necessary checks and preparations. However, for a significant 
number of operations the delivery of this equipment was often delayed due to staff 
shortages, equipment failure or time pressures within SSU. We recorded that these delays 
rarely occurred early in the mornings as SSU was able to clean and prepare equipment 
‘out of hours’, but it struggled to turn-around instruments within a short time period 
between similar procedures. Furthermore, on a small number of occasions 
instrumentation was brought to the operating department which was either incorrect or 
faulty, indicating shortcomings in the capacity for this department to clean and check 
surgical equipment thoroughly, which was often seen as the result of staff shortages. 
Again these problems placed further time and resource pressures on work in the operating 
department. 
 
“We have just sent two Health Care Assistants to SSU to collect the trays, they 
are short of staff and can’t cope…we often help out…we need to if we want to get 
on with the list” (Theatre Sister: field notes) 
 
“[its important]…all the instruments are sterile, I mean yes, we do get instances 
where we don’t have the right tackle available, or we have malfunctioning 
equipment.” (P53). 
 
We observed that the relationships with Histopathology and Radiographic services also 
had the potential to undermine the workings of the operating theatre, although to a lesser 
extent than some of the other departments. We found that delayed, missing or incorrect 
exchanges of information, such as blood supplies, test results and X-rays could seriously 
undermine and impair anaesthetic and surgical decision-making during or immediately 
prior to the start of an operation. From our observations of anaesthetic work we recorded 
that about a quarter of anaesthetists experienced some form of delay for pathology 
results, and on a small number of occasions the late delivery of X-rays or other scans 
impeded surgical activity. More significantly on two occasions we recorded how the 
wrong test results were delivered to the operating department. In most cases it appeared 
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that the tests and X-Rays in question were generated by last minute requests for 
information. 
 
“Another issue is with pre-operative blood test which may not be available. One 
of the lists I do is a renal list and the patient should have the potassium levels 
measures…but sometimes the potassium is not available.” (P20) 
 
“We have had to delay surgery for several hours because there is no blood 
available” (P29) 
 
“The great urological example is the surgeon who took the wrong kidney out, you 
have X-rays not available, X-rays wrongly marked, people making assumptions.” 
(P54) 
 
Given the operating department’s function dependence on these inter-departmental 
relationships such ‘breakdowns’, either as delayed, missing or incorrect exchanges 
constituted significant problems to the effective and safe delivery of surgical care, as the 
network of organisational interactions would fracture and de-align from what was 
scheduled. Returning to our earlier analysis it was apparent that each of these specialist 
departments experienced certain failures of problems in completing their tasks, often 
associated with the endemic problems of resource constraint and competing demands, but 
because of the tight coupling between departments, these rarely remained isolated within 
each department but instead combine and spread across the wider organisation manifest 
as organisational breakdowns, and influencing the work of the operating department at 
the hub of this network.  
 
“Well the organisation is chaotic, and in a chaotic organisation risk is always 
there…there is no order…. At the moment it is like Concorde is about to take off 
in three minutes, so you are on the flight deck and you suddenly think have we 
put all the petrol in, the pilot isn’t here, where’s the food!” (P19) 
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The impact on the operating department and patient safety 
 
Many of these organisational breakdowns were small in character and isolated to a single 
inter-departmental exchange, having little impact upon the overall workings of the 
operating theatre at the centre of this hospital network. Typically they introduced slight 
adjustments to the start and finish times of the surgical procedures as delayed, missing or 
incorrect exchanges were rectified. Our observations indicated that staff working in the 
‘theatres’ had learnt to cope with many of these problems, whilst in some cases one 
problem could coincidently offset or compensate for another. For example, the delayed 
arrival of a patient from the surgical ward could give the theatre staff additional time to 
complete instrumentation checks, or the wait for a guaranteed HDU bed often gave the 
anaesthetists extra time to acquire missing test results. On many occasions staff also used 
these situations to take missed breaks or talk with colleagues. We found therefore that in 
both organisational and cultural terms the operating department had come to expect, 
tolerate and work with many of these problems. We also noted, however, that because 
staff had come to expect and accept many of these situations this had the perverse effect 
of further undermining the smooth running of theatres as some staff members, especially 
surgeons, would often arrive late to the operating department assuming that the scheduled 
start time would already be postponed. 
 
Nevertheless, these breakdowns did have a negative impact on the provision of surgical 
care, especially when key resources failed to arrive or were delayed in excess of 20 
minutes. Furthermore, these breakdowns could have a cumulative effect as one inter-
departmental relationship fractured, for example between theatres and the ward, this 
could further de-align relationships with other departments, such as between theatres and 
HDU, leading to increased change and uncertainty across the wider system. This seemed 
to indicate that despite weekly management planning, the organisation of this network 
was inflexible to the changes and problems that often emerged within any one 
relationship. We found that during these periods the operating department was 
characterised by high degrees of constraint (time, resource or emotional pressure), change 
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(as plans were modified to accommodate constraint) and uncertainty (as staff struggled to 
understand what these changes involved). These situations could have a profound effect 
on the delivery of surgical care through negatively influencing individual and group work 
within and around the operating theatre. 
 
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of these breakdowns was the introduction of 
constraint and pressure in the work of the operating theatre. This was typically found in 
two ways, time pressures brought about by delays or changes to the scheduled theatre 
timetable, and resource constraints as staff were forced to work in sub-optimal 
conditions. Time pressures were brought about by delayed inter-departmental exchanges 
or during the periods when missing or incorrect exchanges were rectified. At first these 
situations would enable staff to complete other tasks more thoroughly, for example, 
nurses would have greater preparation time and surgeons could attend to ‘paperwork’. 
However, these situations would invariably postpone the scheduled time of a procedure 
and when the missing, delayed or incorrect resources were remedied there was greater 
pressure on staff to work more quickly with the intention of making up ‘lost time’. This 
could be seen with all staff groups increasing the pace at which they worked. For 
example, anaesthetic staff would often comment informally on the pressures to prepare 
and anaesthetise the patient quickly, whilst for the surgeon, it was recorded how time 
constraints placed pressure on them to ‘close’ and finish the procedure more rapidly 
thereby saving or making time.  
 
“I think it is putting more stress on the individual practitioner because they don’t 
have enough time to make a careful enough assessment of patients before they 
start because of this pressure” (P15) 
 
“There are time factors because you have got a set period of time to do the 
anaesthesia and you have got a list with a set number of patients on and you have 
got to make sure those two things fit together” (P21) 
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These situations were seemingly made worse when incorrect or delayed resources could 
not be rectified. In some observations the nature of the missing resource meant that the 
operation was cancelled, for example with unavailable HDU beds or malfunctioning 
instrumentation. In other, less severe, cases these shortcomings seemed to make it more 
difficult for theatre staff to complete their work, for example we observed several 
instances of surgeons improvising with equipment, ‘making do’ with what was available, 
rather than cancel or change the theatre schedule. 
 
Where certain resources were unavailable or delayed by over 30 minutes the pressure to 
work faster or improvise was replaced by the need to change the planned schedule of 
work. This would either involve switching the order of patients within one operating 
session or postponing the operation until another day. One of the most common sources 
of change was due to the lack of HDU beds, whereby the planned procedure would be re-
arranged for later in the day or week when a bed would be available. However, other 
inter-departmental problems could also necessitate change, for example a patient 
inadvertently being given food on the surgical ward thereby preventing aneasthesia. 
These changes were often made on the assumption that it was not just technically 
necessary but also safer to change the planned procedure. However, these changes, often 
made at the last minute, introduced a range of additional pressures and difficulties into 
the ways in which the wider system functioned and ‘theatre’ staff worked. In particular 
changes to the scheduled order of operations could de-align other planned inter-
departmental exchanges arranged for other operations within the same day, for example, 
in one of our observations the first patient of the day was cancelled due to the lack of 
HDU beds with the second planned patient being brought forward in the surgical list, but 
the resources needed for this procedure, such as test results and equipment, were not in 
place because they had been planned for a later time. These situations therefore created 
their own problems as the wider inter-departmental network of supplies and resources 
were not geared up to these last minute changes, further exacerbating the delays, time 
constraints and the uncertainty of work. Specifically, staff seemed to be unsure about 
what they were supposed to be doing, and struggled to make sense of and bring order to a 
rapidly changing work environment. 
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“Risk comes along when things are changed at fairly short notice and I think one 
of our big risks is actually the operating list itself, [when] the list has changed, the 
patients have changed order or you have sent for a patient off one list and then the 
porter will come back with the wrong patient” (P8)  
 
“Another safety issue is changes to the operating theatre list order…this is a huge 
safety issue in that if the second patient on the list is Mr Joe Bloggs who is having 
a left side hernia repaired and you swap him for Mr John Smith who is having a 
right side hernia repaired there is a significant chance of somebody giving the 
wrong person the wrong operation” (P20) 
 
Ultimately these constraints and changes introduced high levels of uncertainty into the 
work of the operating department. We observed how staff members would become 
increasingly anxious, confused, or hot-tempered when trying to cope with and deal with 
these unfolding circumstances. There was a general sense that the surgical team was 
starting to unravel as they were placed under increased pressures, struggled to cope with 
the unplanned changes occurring around them and had to face growing uncertainties in 
their work. Communication would become fractious and incomplete, for example, staff 
would sometimes fail to ‘read-back’ number counts when carrying out instrumentation or 
swab checks; decision-making would became dominated by the surgeon with little regard 
to the needs or work of other staff members within the theatre; individuals would often 
revert back to working within their specialist professional groups rather than engaging in 
multi-professional teamwork; and hostility in the theatre was common, for example, 
surgeons would sometimes shout at the theatre nurses for not completing their 
preparations within time, and on a number of other occasions both surgeons and theatre 
nurses would complain about the slow work of the anaesthetists further holding up the 
theatre order. It was also noted how during these situations staff would sometimes deviate 
from planned activities and departmental policies, for example, in order to expedite 
procedures certain equipment checking procedures would be missed or short-cut as staff 
sought to make back time. Although relatively rare notable occasions include the 
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preparation of pain relief, the checking of anaesthetic machine, and the pre-operative 
instrumentation counts. In general this uncertainty, the underlying basis of risk (Lupton, 
1999) required professionals to work ‘on the edge’ (see also Fox, 1975) where there was 
little slack to accommodate potential unsafe or substandard practice. 
 
“Well I think the knock on effect is that you may find yourself dealing with a list 
of patients who haven’t been as well prepared as you would have liked and you 
are having to rely on your wits at the time to solve any problems.” (P15) 
 
“You forget things, you can’t remember which patient you are anaesthetising, you 
can’t remember which side, you do something on the wrong side and generally 
your mind is just not thinking about the job, you are thinking about something 
else” (P19) 
 
When inter-departmental relationships broke down the delivery of surgical care in the 
operating theatre was characterised by constraints, changes and uncertainties which 
impacted upon individual and group work. Individuals would become anxious, irritable 
and erratic; communication between group members would be fragmented, 
confrontational and incomplete; and the normal routines and checks would be sometimes 
be missed or cut short. It can be anticipated that under these conditions the delivery of 
surgical care is likely to become less than optimal and potential unsafe. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The work of hospital operating department can be seen as part of a complex system or 
network where work in operating theatres is heavily dependent upon other hospital 
departments (Plsek and Wilson, 2001). Despite efforts by managers and administrators to 
plan the work of the operating department and co-ordinate these inter-departmental 
relationships we found that ‘breakdowns’ within this network, whether delayed, missing 
or incorrect exchanges, impaired and comprised the effective functioning of the 
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department, through introducing constraints, changes and uncertainties. The prevailing 
logic of patient safety policy draws on attention to the ‘upstream’ and ‘latent factors’ that 
threaten patient safety, but as suggested earlier this form of analysis typically remains 
focussed at the immediate environmental factors that shape group or individual practice, 
or those issues that are perhaps more amenable to management-led change. Drawing 
from the work of Perrow (1984) we have widened our analysis to look more at the 
organisational system or network that shapes the delivery of care in the operating 
department. Here we find that the operating department is ‘tightly coupled’ and 
dependant upon the performance of other hospital departments. Each of these 
departments has the potential to experience rapid change or operational failure, which is 
not always contained to the individual department, but ripples across the wider network 
of inter-departmental relationships affecting the work of the operating department and 
also producing a cumulative feedback effect back across the wider organisation. The 
inflexibility of this network to respond, accommodate or tolerate these ripples 
undermines the effective and safe workings of the operating department at the centre of 
this network. As such the organisational complexity and inter-dependency of the 
operating department turns minor or isolated incidents into more profound uncertainties 
and risks, and in doing so making the threats to patient safety almost normal. This 
analysis builds on and extents the prevailing understanding of patient safety and latent 
factors found in policy. 
 
The picture of the operating theatres environment emerging from our study was as a place 
where teams struggled to deliver services under difficult circumstances. Teamwork, in 
this context, appeared to be interpreted as a process of speeding up working processes in 
response to time pressures. However, what this means is that members of staff are 
unlikely to deviate from or voice objections to the pursuit of this common purpose, even 
though this increases risks to safety in the operating theatre. Whilst it may be difficult to 
influence these cultural norms about what constitutes appropriate behaviour (Stryer and 
Clancy, 2005) there are other actions, which can be taken more immediately to reduce 
threats to safety. In particular, our data highlight that workload planning and theatre 
timetabling must be informed by an appreciation of wider systems factors, as opposed to 
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focusing on discrete elements and simply monitoring the actual versus planned time taken 
to complete operations. 
 
By characterising the work of the operating department in terms of its tight couplings 
with other hospital departments it is possible to suggest that greater attention should be 
focussed on loosening the interactive bonds to introduce slack and redundancy into the 
functioning of the network. The idea of improving redundancy and establishing better 
back-up systems certainly conforms to the principles of High Reliability Theory (Rijpma, 
1997), but it is also worth bearing in mind Perrow’s (1984) observation that increased 
redundancy is often difficult to achieve when dealing with organisations with 
differentiated and complex tasks and where processes have common determinants of 
success, i.e. the source of uncertainty can affect both the primary and back-up system. 
The management and planning of the operating department largely failed to take account 
of the wider relationships that impact on performance. Although it was recognised that 
each unit should perform better individually and co-ordination was needed between 
departments there was a tendency for managers to consider each part in isolation when 
planning and scheduling theatre work, for example how the wards could impact upon 
theatres, but not how the wider network as a whole functioned. As such the aim of 
managers was to more thoroughly and tightly plan the work of the department and its 
resource needs from other departments, but this failed to consider the inter-dependence 
and how small problems could have a knock-on or ripple effect for the wider network. 
This reflects much current management thinking, which largely assumes that a well 
functioning organisation is akin to a well-oiled machine and treats each part of the 
machine as a discrete entity (Taylor, 2003).  This tendency to focus analysis and change 
at the departmental level is further advanced by the prevailing logic of patient safety that 
tends to reduce analysis to the localised work environment and not the wider 
organisational structures. By failing to take into account the ‘real world’ context of 
service organisation the risks to patient safety are increased.  
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